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THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CAUSES OF ACTION
BASED ON THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS
The concurrent and non-exclusive character of the jurisdic-
tion conferred upon state and federal courts by the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Acts has given rise to a great deal of juris-
dictional controversy.' Such controversy has for the most part
been directed at obtaining a workable adjustment of the power
'A full discussion of the jurisdictional problems arising out of the acts
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to take jurisdiction as between federal and state courts presiding
over approximately the same geographical area.
There is, however, another and an increasingly important
problem which has to do, not with the adjustment of the jurisdic-
tional power between state and federal courts, but rather with
the propriety of a state court's exercising its power to take juris-
diction when a foreign state or federal court might better pass
upon the case. This latter problem stands out boldly from the
facts in the case of Douglas v. New York, N. H., anzd H. R. R.
recently decided by the United States Supreme Court. In this
action, the plaintiff, a resident of Connecticut, brought suit un-
der the Federal Employers' Liability Act against a Connecticut
railroad corporation in a New York state court for injuries sus-
tained in Connecticut. The defendant railroad operated exten-
sive trackage in New York. A statute 3 of that state authorizes
suits by non-residents against foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the state. The New York courts, while admitting that
they had power to take jurisdiction, refused 4 to pass upon the
case, basing their action upon a rule r of that state which per-
mits the exercise of discretion in refusing to hear suits arising
under the statute in question. The United States Supreme Court,
on certiorari, took the view that the Federal Employers' Liability
Acts did not make it mandatory upon a state court to take juris-
diction in all cases, where, as here, the state court had the power
in question is to be found in 2 ROBERT'S, FEDERAL LIABILITIES OP CAmms
(2d ed. 1929) 1840-88. See also THORNTON, FEDE&AL EuFLoyms' LMBUnTY
ACT (3d ed. 1916) 275-289. Most of the authorities are collected in Note
(1912) 40 L. R. A. (N.s.) 684; 45 U. S. C. A. (1928) § 56, nn. 28-30; 28
ibid. § 71, nn. 281-292.
249 Sup. Ct. 355 (U. S. 1929).
3 
"An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained . . . by
a non-resident . . . where a foreign corporation is doing business with-
in the state." N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 24, § 47.
4 Douglas v. N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R, 223 App. Div. 782, 227 N. Y.
Supp. 797 (2d Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 580, 162 N. E. 532 (1928).
5 Previous to the passage of the New York statute (supra note 3) it was
generally recognized that the courts of New York were invested with a
discretionary power to decline to eritertain a foreign tort action brought
under the doctrine of comity by a non-resident. Robinson v. Oceanic Steam
Nay. Co, 112 N. Y. 315, 19 N. E. 625 (1889); Collard v. Beach, 81 App.
Div. 582, 81 N. Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dep't 1903); Pietraroia v. N. J. and H. R.
Ry. and Ferry Co., 197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. 120 (1910). In construing the
above statute, the courts of New York have maintained that the exercise
of jurisdiction in such cases has not been made mandatory but still re-
mains a matter of sound judicial discretion. Waisikoski v. Philadelphia and
Reading C. and I. Co., 173 App. Div. 538, 159 N. Y. Supp. 906 (2d Dep't
1916) ; Bagdon v. Phila. and R. C. and I. Co., 178 App. Div. 662, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 910 (2d Dep't 1917); Comment (1928) 37 YAx L. J. 983-987. But
cf. Gregonis v. Phila. and R. C. and I. Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223
(1923) (court held not to have discretionary power to refuse jurisdiction
where plaintiff is a bona fide resident of New York).
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to entertain the action.6 In addition, it denied that the refusal
of the New York courts to hear the suit contravened the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution.'
The amendment of 1910 8 to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act of 1908 9 settled any doubts 10 which previously may have
existed as to the power of state courts of competent jurisdiction
to enforce rights created by that act. Yet a more serious
problem arises, namely, whether a state court, having jurisdic-
8 "As to the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that
statute does not purport to require state courts to entertain suits arising
under it but only to empower them to do so, so far as the authority of the
United States is concerned." Supra note 2, at 356.
7 This holding proceeds upon the theory that a citizen of New York
actually residing in Connecticut would be denied entrance into the courts
of New York in the same manner and under the same circumstances as
would a resident-citizen of Connecticut. The validity of this distinction
between residence and citizenship for the purpose of avoiding discrimina-
tion under the equal privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Con-
stitution has been productive of much debate. See ROBERTS, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 961; Hansell, The Proper Forum for Suits Against Foreign Car-
porations (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 12, 16; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law (1929) 29 COL. L. Rv. 1, 3; Comment
(1928) 37 Y.ALE L. J. 983, 984; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rzv. 387; Note
(1928) 28 COL. L. Rnv. 347; (1903) 17 HARv. L. REV. 54. Recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court go a long way toward sustaining such
a distinction if based upon reasonable grounds. LaTourette v. McMaster,
248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160 (19f9); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525,
40 Sup. Ct. 2 (1919).
This distinction between residence and citizenship has raised further
constitutional questions when viewed as a possible violation of either the
equal protection provision of the 14th Amendment or of the due process
clause. See Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236
Mass. 185, 194, 128 N. E. 4, 7 (1920); Blake v. McKlung, 172 U. S. 239,
259, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 173 (1898); Hansell, op. cit. supra at 18, 19.
8 " . ... an action may be brought in a circuit (now district) court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in
which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing
business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with
that of the courts of the several States and no case arising under this
chapter and brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any court of the United States." 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U.
S. C. § 56 (1926).
935 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1926).
10 Even before the passage of the 1910 amendment (supra note 8) to the
liability act of 1908, practically all of the state courts of competent juris-
diction had been passing upon suits based on that act. The power of the
state courts to exercise this jurisdiction was questioned, apparently, only
by the Connecticut state tribunals. Hoxie v. N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R.,
82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754 (1909); Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R.,
82 Conn. 373, 73 At]. 762 (1909), rev'd, Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912) ; Note L. R. A. 1915C 47, 75.
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tion, may withhold the exercise "I of its power to entertain such
a suit. Decisions which maintain that jurisdiction must be as-
sumed as a matter of "legal right" beg the whole question of
the propriety of exercising jurisdiction. 2 Likewise such decisions
read into the Federal Employers' Liability Acts an attempt on
the part of Congress not only to authorize the taking of jurisdic-
tion by a; state court but to insist that it be exercised." Such a
construction is directly opposed to the assertion by the United
States Supreme Court that these acts merely preserved the juris-
dictional power which the state courts had previously possessed.1'
As a general proposition, state courts are frequently empowered
to refuse to take jurisdiction even though the parties to an ac-
tion have been properly served and are before the forum." Yet
11 In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction "be-
tween the existence of jurisdiction over the subject matter of foreign
transitory actions and jurisdiction over the parties (especially foreign cor-
porations), and the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular case" Note
(1924) 32 A. L. R. 7, 26; Comment (1928) 37 YAm L. J. 983, n. 1 and cases
cited.
12 In the Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 10, at 56, 32
Sup. Ct. at 177, Mr. Justice Van Devanter said: "Rights arising under the
acts in question (the liability acts of 1908) may be enforced, as of 'right,
in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local
laws, is adequate to the occasion." (Italics ours). This broad language
when read in its context is qualified by the further statement that the
state court's jurisdiction must not only be competent but also "accustomed
to be exercised." But divorced from its context, it has served as a basis
for holding that a competent state tribunal cannot refuse to entertain
suits properly brought before it under the Federal Employers' Liability
Acts. Such an example is the case of State ex. rel. Schendel v. District
Court, 156 Minn. 380, 194 N. W. 780 (1923), in which the administrator
of a deceased resident of Wisconsin brought an action in* a state court in
Minnesota where the defendant operated a portion of its railroad lines.
The suit was based upon the liability acts for injuries received in Wisconsin
during the course of the deceased's employment by the defendant. The
court said:, "Under the doctrine of the Second Employers' Liability Cases,
the state court must exercise its jurisdiction .... It is not a matter of
pleasure. It may not want the case. It may think the burden . . . should
be borne in another state, but there is a right in the suitor and a corres-
ponding duty in the court . . . ." See also Davis v. Minneapolis, St. P.
Ry., 134 Minn. 455, 457, 159 N. W. 1084, 1085 (1916).
The same argument has been advanced as a reason for refusing an in-
junction against the prosecution of a suit under the liability acts in a
foreign state court. Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922);
Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa 737, 198 N. W. 62 (1924). But cf. Reed's
Adm'x v. Ill. Central R. R., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918); Chicago,
M1. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921).
Is Supra note 12, and cases there cited. See also .ROmBTs, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 960.
14Scond Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 10, at 56, 32 Sup. Ct.
at 178; cf. Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2 (1916); White v. Mo.
Pac. Ry., 178 S. W. 83 (Mo. 1915).
"s Collard v. Beach; Waisikoski v. Philadelphia and Reading C. and I.
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if jurisdiction must necessarily be assumed as a matter of "legal
right" whenever a suit based upon the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Acts is brought before a state tribunal, it would seem that
the federal act in question accomplished considerably more than
the mere preservation of the jurisdictional power of the state
tribunals.16
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in the Douglas
case, maintained that the Federal Employers' Liability Acts did
not purport to force on the state courts a duty to take jurisdic-
tion "as against an otherwise valid excuse." 1, The problem im-
mediately presents itself as to what constitutes a valid excuse
for declining to take jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held
that a state court cannot excuse a refusal to grant relief upon the
grouihd that a federal statute has been invoked as the basis of
a right, since to do so would tend to undermine the supremacy
of the federal law.,, But apparently under the facts of the
Douglas case, where no question of federal supremacy is involved,
the foreign character of an action is deemed a valid excuse for
a refusal to entertain the case.
It is doubtful whether the foreign character of an action
brought in a state court to enforce a right growing out of the
Federal Employers' Liability Acts, if it stood alone, would always
be regarded as a valid excuse for a refusal to pass on the case.
In order to provide effective remedies for the "enforcement of
existing rights, it has been found necessary to broaden the power
of local courts to take jurisdiction of actions against foreign cor-
porations and non-residents. 19 Such enlargement of local juris-
Co., both supra note 5; Mexican National Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33
S. W. 857 (1896); Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper
Co., supra note 7; State ex. rel. Goldwyn Distributing Corp. v. Gehrz, 181
Wis. 238, 194 N. W. 418 (1923). For an exhaustive collection of authoriticn
see Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 7, 43.
16 As a general proposition Congress has no power to legislate concerning
the jurisdiction of state courts. St. L., Iron Mt. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S.
281, 28 Sup. Ct. 616 (1907); Chambers v. B. and 0. R. R., 207 U. S. 142,
28 Sup. Ct. 34 (1907); Minneapolis and St. L. R. R. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S.
211, 36 Sup. Ct. 595 (1916) ; see ROBERTS, op. cit. s upra note 1, § 960.
17 Sapra note 2, at 356.
is Second Employer's Liability Cases, supra note 10, at 57, 32 Sup. Ct. at
178; Note L. R. A. 1918E 917, 918, and cases cited.
29 See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 167, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 32 (1916)
(sustaining the constitutionality of a state statute requiring non-resident
motorists to appoint a state officer as an agent upon whom service of
summons may be made)i; International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U. S.
579, 585, 34 Sup. Ct. 944, 946 (1914) (state held to have the power to force
a foreign manufacturing corporation having only a soliciting agent within
the state to subject itself to a suit in a state court as a condition to doing
business in the state). The development of a widened local jurisdiction is
traced by Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals
Who Carry on Business Within the Territory (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 676.
[Vol. 39
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diction has been found particularly essential if individuals are
to secure justice in their dealings with foreign trading groups
which carry on vast interstate enterprises and either have pur-
posely set up their corporate residence in some favorable for-
eign state or are naturally established in a financial center re-
mote from many of the localities where their business is actually
conducted.2- Of what practical worth is a right of action against
such a corporation if it becomes necessary to travel a thousand
miles to discover a court which possesses the power to grant a
remedy? In actions against foreign carriers for the loss or dam-
age of goods consigned for shipment the Carmack amendment '
was enacted to provide effective relief in just such a situation.2
The need of an effective remedy for the enforcement of rights
against foreign railroad companies has appeared sufficiently im-
portant to the Supreme Court to cause it to justify as not un-
reasonable the assumption of jurisdiction over such actions by
state tribunals through garnishment of traffic balances.-
Since the passage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of
1908, an effort has been made to secure an effective enforce-
ment of the rights created by this act by providing that a local
forum may determine causes of action against foreign railroad
Also see Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts (1928) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 499, 523 et seq.
20 The need of providing an effective enforcement of rights against for-
eign corporations is particularly evident from the facts of Southern Ry.
v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 Sup. Ct. 329 (1929). The plaintiff purchased
in New Orleans a through ticket to Washington. The ticket called for a
part of the journey to be made over the lines of the Southern, a railroad
operating only a soliciting agency in Louisiana. The plaintiff was injured
while traveling on this railroad in Virginia and brought his action for
damages in Louisiana. A rule of that state allows suits against foreign
corporations only if the injury arose from a transaction taking place within
the state. Since it would be manifestly unjust to force the plaintiff to go
to Virginia or the state of the railroad's corporate domicile, the court con-
strued the sale of the ticket in Louisiana to be the transaction out of which
the injury arose. In most states it is not necessary in such a situation to
show that the injury accrued from a transaction occurring within the
state. (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1148. Cf. Tauzo v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917) ; Cahill, loc. cit. supra note 19.
In the reverse situation where a foreign corporation is seeking a remedy
against a local resident, the state tribunals cannot refuse a remedy. To
do so has been held to burden interstate commerce. International Textbook
Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481 (1910); Sioux Remedy v. Cope,
235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57 (1914) ; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondu-
rant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 Sup. Ct. 106 (1921).
2134 STAT. 584, 595 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 20 (1926).
2 See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 200,
31 Sup. Ct. 164, 168 (1911); Galveston Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 491,
32 Sup. Ct. 201, 207 (1912); .Note (1911) 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1.
23 State ex rcl. St. L. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47 (19-4).
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corporations.24 The amendment of 1910 substantially abolished
the power of removal from a state to a federal court on a claim
of diversity of citizenship set up by the foreign railroad com-
pany. 25 It also specifically enlarged the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts 26 by allowing an action on the part of an injured
employee to be maintained not only in the district of the car-
rier's residence (to which locality he had previously been lim-
ited), but also in the district where the cause of action accrued,
or where the defendant was doing business at the commence-
ment of the suit, or at the place of the plaintiff's residence. As
to the reason for this enlargement of federal jurisdiction, Mr.
Borah, speaking for the Judiciary Committee of the Senate,
declared:
"To permit it (restriction of suit to courts of the carrier's
residence) to be a practical barrier to the maintenance of an
action for death or personal injuries to employees who may be
presumed to be unable to meet the expense of presenting their
case in a jurisdiction far from their homes, would be an injustice
too grave and serious to be longer permitted to exist." 27
The applicability of this argument to an action of a similar
nature brought in a state tribunal was recognized by the New
York Court of Appeals, in Murnan v. Wabash Ry.:
"It is urged with force that it was reasonable for a resident
of Connecticut in reduced circumstances to sue the defendant in
New York where he could obtain service of summons rather than
go to Indiana where the defendant was incorporated." 28
24 Because of the humanitarian character of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Acts, the courts have construed these measures liberally and in favor
of the injured employee. Cf. Hulac v. Chicago and N. W. Ry., 194 Fed. 747
(D. Neb. 1912); Schuppenies v. Oregon Short Line, 38 Idaho 672, 225 Pac.
501 (1924); B. and 0. R. R. v. Branson, 128 Md. 678, 98 Atl, 225 (1916);
Woolsey v. Wabash Ry., 274 S. W. 871 (Mo. 1925).
25 Southern Ry. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 37 Sup. Ct. 703 (1917) ; Kansas
City Southern Ry. v. Leslie, 238 U. S. 599, 35 Sup. Ct. 844 (1915) ; Straus-
ser v. Chicago R. R., 193 Fed. 293 (D. Neb. 1912).
It has been stated that under the amendment of 1910 (supra note 8)
removal may not be had from a competent state tribunal to a federal court
on any ground whatsoever. But removal has been allowed where the suit
is brought against a receiver of a railroad appointed by a federal court.
Elliott v. Wheelock, 34 F. (2d) 213 (W. D. Mo. 1929); Newell v. Byram,
26 F. (2d) 200 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). Contra: Knapp v. Byram, 21 F. (2d)
226 (D. Minn. 1927).
26 Supra note 8.
:- H. 1. REP. 17263 (1910) ; cf. Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 30 Sup. Ct. 184 (1910) (cited by Mr. Borah as illus-
trative of the remediless situation in which an injured railroad employee
might find himself under the narrow restrictions on the venue of federal
courts provided by the Employers' Liability Act of 1908).
28 246 N. Y. 244, 249, 158 N. E. 508, 509 (1927); cf. Murnan v. Wabash
Ry., 220 App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y. Supp. 332 (2d Dep't 1927).
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Under a strong showing of facts like those presented in the
Murunn case it seems unlikely that the foreign character of the
action would justify a state court in declining to take jurisdic-
tion. But whereas in the Murnan case-a refusal to exercise juris-
diction would have necessitated taking the action to Indiana or
Michigan,29 in the Douglas case a refusal by the New York court
to pass on the action only resulted in forcing the injured employee
to. seek his remedy in the state courts of Connecticut or in an
appropriate federal forum.2 0 On analysis the dividing line be-
tween the cases appears fairly clear. The refusal of a state
court to assume jurisdiction cannot be based solely upon the
foreign character of the action, but may well be justified as a
means of controlling the abuses of imported litigation.
Courts and legislative bodies alike have objected to the re-
moval of a cause of action from the natural forum of the plain-
tiff's residence, where the injury occurred, where the witnesses
and documents essential for a proper determination of the issues
are presumably located, and where the defendant has its cor-
29 The injury in question occurred in Michigan. Upon a review of the
propriety of exercising jurisdiction ordered by the New York Court of
Appeals, the New York Supreme Court concluded that the circumstances
were such as to require the courts of the state to retain jurisdiction. Miur-
nan v. Wabash Ry., 222 App. Div. 833, 226 N. Y. Supp. 393 (2d Dep't 1928).
30 An action based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Acts may be
brought in a federal court as of right whenever the suit falls within its
venue as prescribed by the amendment of 1910. Even though such an action
is brought in a federal district court foreign both to the residence of the
plaintiff and defendant and in another district to that in which the injury
occurred, the case must be entertained if the railroad is doing business
within the district. Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924);
See State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court, supra note 12, at 384, 194 N.
W. at 782; ROBF.RTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1842. Even the fact that
such an action will burden interstate commerce will not excuse a federal
court from taking jurisdiction. Schendel v. McGee, supra; Norris v. Ill.
Central R. R., 18 F. (2d) 584 (D. Minn. 1925). Nor will difficulties of the
defendant in procuring its witnesses excuse a federal court from hearing
the case. Trapp v. B. and 0. R. R., 283 Fed. 655 (E. D. Ohio 1922); Con-
nelly v. C. R. R. of N. J., 238 Fed. 932 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
Similarly, a state court cannot decline an action based on the Federal
Employers' Liability Acts if instituted by a resident of the forum. Davis v.
Minneapolis, St. P. Ry., supra note 12; State ex rel. St. L. Ry. v. Taylor,
supra note 23; cf. Gregonis v. Phila. and R. C. and I. Co., supra note 5. If,
however, the residence is not bona fide but has been secured merely for
the purpose of bringing suit, a state court may decline jurisdiction. Michi-
gan Central R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct. 207 (1929); cf.
Pietraroia v. N. J. and H. R. Ry. and Ferry Co., supra note 5; Hoes v.
N. Y., N. H. and H. R. B., 173 N. Y. 435, 66 N. E. 119 (1903). Although
it has been urged that the practice of entertaining jurisdiction whenever the
plaintiff is a resident is based largely on "sentiment" (Blair, op. cit. supra
note 7. at 7, n. 35), still in such a case one party or the other must move
himself and his witnesses from his residence, and to do so probably im-
poses less hardship on the railroad.
1930]
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porate domicile. The liberal common law principle of comity has
been limited by the assertion of a discretionary power to refuse
to entertain a foreign cause of action brought before thE forum
for a vexatious purpose orto gain some real or fancied procedural
advantage.31 Because of the wide interstate character of railroad
enterprises, more explicit restrictions on an unbridled abuse of
comity have been thought necessary. For example, the venue of
actions brought against transit companies in state tribunals has
been definitely limited by statute.3 2 And such statutes have been
held applicable to non-residents suing a foreign railroad corpora-
tion under the Federal Employers' Liability Acts.3 3 When the
transportation systems of the nation were under government
direction during the war, all suits against carriers had to be
brought either in the district where the cause of action accrued
or in the district of the plaintiff's residence .3
31 See an exhaustive treatment of this subject in Blair, op. cit. sup-'a note
7. Also Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 7; Hansell, op. cit. eupra note 7.
The main reason for the development of the doctrine of comity was to
prevent an individual from escaping responsibility by moving into a foreign
jurisdiction. Such a reason does not apply to a railroad corporation whose
domicile is permanently localized. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Weeks,
254 Fed. 513, 518 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918).
32 "An action against . . . a railroad . . . or transportation company
may be breught in any county through or into which such . . .
railroad . . . passes or extends . . . provided that all actions . . .must
be brought in the county in which the cause of action . . . afose or in the
county in which the claimant . . . resides . . . . If no part of such line
* * * be located in such county, then such actions may be brought in a
county in which any part of such road is located nearest the place where
the claimant . . . resided." 2 OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1927) § 11273.
" . . .No action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover
for a death occurring outside this state. . . . " ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill,
1927) c. 70, § 2. This statute, while not aimed specifically at suits brought
against carriers, has been found particularly effective in preventing im-
ported actions against them.
See also an Iowa statute, infra note 40, attempting to restrain the ex-
port of foreign litigation, also especially effective in the case of carriers.
3 In Loftus v. Penn. R. R., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E. 94 (1923), the
Ohio statute in question, supra note 32, was held to prevent the taking of
jurisdiction in a suit by a resident of Pennsylvania against a railroad
corporation operating trackage in Ohio for injuries sustained in Pennsyl-
vania. Cf. Walton v. Pryor, supra note 14; In re Spoo's Estate, 191 Iowa
1134, 183 N. W. 580 (1921).
34 "Whereas it appears that suits against carriers . . . are being brought
in states and jurisdictions far remote from the place where the plaintiffs
reside or where the cause of action arose, the effect being that men operat-
ing the traing . . . are required to leave their trains and attend courts
as witnesses and travel sometimes hundreds of miles from their work
necessitating absence . . . sometimes for a week or more which practice
is highly prejudicial to ... the physical operation of the railroads and the
practice of suing in remote jurisdictions is not necessary for the protection
of the rights or just interest of the plaintiffs . . . All suits must be
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Attempts have been made to curtail imported litigation brought
against carriers by the issuance of an injunction by a court of
the plaintiff's residence restraining what well might be termed
the "export" of such litigation.3 5 The hardship imposed upon a
railroad company by a non-resident's suit in a foreign jurisdic-
tion has been regarded as so severe as to constitute a burden on
interstate commerce even when the state court consented to pass
upon the case.38 The restriction of foreign suits against railroads
brought where the plaintiff resided at the time of accrual of the cause of
action or in the county or district where the cause of action arose. . . .
Gen. Order Nos. 18, 18a, of the Director General of Railroads.
3 The right to enjoin the prosecution of an action elsewhere than in
the state of the plaintiff's residence is well settled where such an action
is to prevent fraud or oppression. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10
Sup. Ct. 269 (1890); HIGH, INJUNCTIONS (4th ed. 1905) § 106. But the
application of this doctrine with respect to suits based on the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Acts has been attended with diverse results. The more
sensible view seems to be that taken by the Wisconsin court in Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, supra note 12, in which it was stated: "There
is nothing in the Federal Employers' Liability Acts . . . which is indicative
of an intent on the part of Congress to prohibit a court of equity from
so regulating the conduct of its own citizens by an injunction as to pre-
vent hardship, oppression or fraud . . . " Reed's Adm'x v. Ill. Central
R. R., supra note 12; In re Spoo's Estate, supra note 33; cf. Wabash Ry.
v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N. W. 523 (1919). Contra: Lancaster v.
Dunn; Payne v. Knapp, both supra note 12; cf. Chicago, M. Ry. v. Schendel,
292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) (state court cannot enjoin prosecution
in a competent foreign federal court).
36 Even if the action in the principal case had been entertained by the
New York courts, the defendant might have been able to set out sufficient
grounds upon which to base a claim of infringement of its constitutional
rights caused by an unnecessary burdening of interstate commerce. Cf.
Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556
(1923) (subjection of a foreign railroad maintaining a soliciting agency
in the state to suit for a foreign tort by a non-resident held to burden
interstate commerce); Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101,
44 Sup. Ct. 469 (1924) (substantially the same facts) ; Weinard v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 298 Fed. 977 (D. Minn. 1924) (suit based on the Federal
Employers' Liability Acts in which the facts were almost identical with
those of the instant case).
The mere fact that the plaintiff had recently acquired residence in the
state of suit was held not to make reasonable the burden imposed on
interstate commerce by hearing the case in a state remote from that in
which the accident occurred. Michigan Central R. R. v. Mix, suipra note 30
(suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Acts). Usually, however,
residence of the plaintiff in the state of suit is held to make reasonable an
interstate commerce burden imposed upon the carrier in defending an
action in a state foreign to that in which the injury occurred. Lefebvre-
Armistead Co. v. So. Pacific Co., 142 Va. 800, 128 S. E. 244 (1925); Grif-
fin v. Seaboard Air Line, 28 F. (2d) 998 (W. D. Mo. 1928); Johnston Y.
Atlantic Coast Line, 128 Misc. 82, 217 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
Maverick Mills v. Davis, 294 Fed. 404 (D. Mass. 1923). These decisions
proceed upon the tht-ory that it is fairer to put the burden of travel upon
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has also been effected by holding an insufficient relationship to
exist between the business being done within the state and the
transaction out of which the foreign cause of action arose. 31
Various reasons of policy make advisable some means of con-
trolling imported litigation brought against carriers under the
Federal Employers' Liability Acts. Waste and inefficiency in-
evitably result from the irrecoverable expense and prolonged
absence from duty involved in procuring the presence of trained
employees as witnesses in a court far removed from the local-
ity where the injury occurred.38 The main purpose of the federal
restriction on the venue of actions against carriers during the
war was to prevent an impairment of the operating efficiency
of the railroads. In Davis v. Farmer's Co-Operative Equity So-
ciety,39 Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that the facts justifying
the issuance of this war time order were of general application
in time of peace as well. He also said:
"The public and carriers are alike interested in maintaining
adequate and uninterrupted transportation service at a reason-
able cost. This common interest is emphasized by the Transpor-
tation Act of 1920 which authorizes rate increases necessary to
the railroad than upon the injured plaintiff. But see Blair, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 24, n. 110.
The operation of trackage in the state of suit by the defending carrier
has been held to justify as not unreasonable a burden placed upon the
railroad defending in that state. Hoffman v. Mo. ex. rel. Foraker, 274
U. S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. 485 (1927); cf. Erving v. Chicago, Northwestern Ry.,
171 Minn. 87, 214 N. W. 12 (1927); Kobbe v. Chicago, Northwestern
Ry., 173 Minn. 79, 216 N. W. 543 (1927). Contra: Weinard v. Chicago,
M. and St. P. Ry., supra (plaintiff attempted to transport his action from
the state of Washington half way across the continent into Minnesota where
the defendant operated some 12% of its trackage). To allow a non-resident
to sue a foreign railroad corporation for a tort committed abroad merely
because the defendant happens to operate a substantial amount of trackage
within the state has been criticized as especially "unsound in result." Blair,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 24, n. 110.
37 Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Equity Co., supra note 36; Cancelmo
v. Seaboard Air Line, 12 F. (2d) 166 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1926); Thurman
v. Chicago Ry., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63 (1926) ; Smart v. Florida East
Coast Ry., 240 Mich. 542, 215 N. W. 390 (1927) ; Gambel Robinson v. Penn.
R. R., 157 Minn. 305, 196 N. W. 266 (1923); Leon v. Central of Georgia,
213 App. Div. 853, 208 N. Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't 1925)-; of. Old Wayne
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236 (1907); Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Selden Brick Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42 Sup. Ct. 84 (1921);
Note L, R. A. 1916E 236; Hansell, op. cit. supra note 7, at 21. But of.
Penn. Fire Ins. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344
(1917).
38 See the text of the Gen. Orders 18 and 18a of the Director General of
Railroads, supra note 34. See also the allegations of the defendant as
presented by the court in Weinard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., supra note
36, at 778.
39 Supra note 36, at 316, 43 Sup. Ct. at557.
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ensure carriers efficiently operated a fair return on property de-
voted to public use."
Various other considerations which have been urged against
imported litigation are equally applicable to suits brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Acts. Thus the solicitation of
liability suits by attorneys in foreign jurisdictions with a repu-
tation for large verdicts has been recognized for what it is-an-
other form of ambulance chasing.40 Since the parties to an action
pay only a relatively small portion of the actual cost of trying a
case, an influx of imported litigation adds to the burdens of local
taxpayers.4' It also tends to delay the determination of causes
of action for which there exists no other forum." It further
complicates, in some instances, the already perplexing problem of
crowded dockets, and is likely to frustrate any legislative scheme
for apportioning the number of courts and judges to the popula-
tion.43 The effect of the amendment of 1910 to the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act of 1908 was to diminish the flood of litiga-
tion swamping the federal courts after the passage of that act."
It would be a strange procedure indeed that would thus relieve
the federal calendars at the expense of still further burdening
the state dockets with a stream of imported litigation entering
through the back door by means of a federal statute43
30 In Weinard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., supra note 36, at 981, the
court recognized in outspoken fashion that an increasingly large volume of
imported litigation was pouring into the state as a result of the efforts
of fifteen Minnesota law firms carrying on systematic ambulance chasing
of this sort. It pointed out that since the dissolution of federal control
over the railroads millions of dollars of claims against railroads operating
in Minnesota had been imported from thirty-one states. See also Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, supra note 12, at 579, 185 N. W. at 223; Reed's
Adm'x v. Ill. Cent. R. R., supra note 12, at 458, 216 S. W. at 795.
In Iowa, "an act to prohibit the so-called practice of ambulance chasing
for the purpose of inducing residents of this state to bring suit outside
this state on general injury and death claims arising in this state," makes
it unlawful to solicit such claims. IOWA CODE (1927) § 13172.
41 Collard v. Beach; Pietraroia v. N. J. and H. R. Ry. and Ferry Co.,
both supra note 5; Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. v. Weeks, supra note 31;
Hansell, op. cit. supra note 7, at 13.
42 Disconto-Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 127 Wis. 651, 106 N. IV. 821 (1906);
Collard v. Beach, supra note 5.
43 Hoes v. N. Y., N. H. and H. R. R., supra note 30; Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. Weeks, supra note 31; Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Equity Co.;
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Wells, both supra note 36; see Blair, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 34. See also infra note 45, and cases there cited.
-4 Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 19, at 509, 517.
45 That this objection is more than theoretical is well evidenced by several
fairly recent decisions. In Weinard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., supra note
36, at 982, it was pointed out that in the four years following the relinquish-
ment of federal control over the railroads, non-residents had brought into
the state against one foreign railroad operating trackage there some 224
1930J
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The desirability of affording individuals a convenient forum
for the enforcement of their rights and yet at the same time
maintaining a workable control of purely imported litigation pre-
sents a problem in no way peculiar to actions brought against
foreign railroad companies by non-residents. It arises whenever
suit is commenced under similar circumstances against a cor-
poration doing a large interstate business.4" Such corporations
generally have branches established in many states and are thus
subject to service of summons in a variety of jurisdictions. Con-
siderations of an orderly judicial administration require that an
injured plaintiff be afforded a convenient and effective remedy.
But may he seek out that jurisdiction which promises to afford
the largest measure of relief and require that court to pass upon
the case? As an answer to this question the language of the
court in Lefebvre-Armistead Co. v. So. Pacific Co.17 seems par-
ticularly appropriate:
"It is not necessary to elaborate upon the injustic!e of permit-
ting a perambulating suitor to tarry at will by the still waters
of some favoring statute or scan the list of judges in the United
States until he finds one believed to have an attentive ear and
then drag all interested into his tribunal."
As a means of controlling the abuses of imported litigation, a
discretionary power in a court to decline to pass upon an action
by a non-resident against a foreign corporation appears to be
actions for over $9,000,000 in damages. The accidents had all occurred
outside the state in question. During the same period local residents
brought only 191 suits for a total of $2,995,000 in damages against this
same railroad for accidents occurring within the state. In Davis v. Far-
mer's Co-operative Equity Co., supra note 36, at 316, 43 Sup. Ct. at 557, Mr.
Justice Brandeis took judicial notice of the fact that there were pending
1,028 personal injury suits aggregating $26,000,000 in damage claims in-
stituted in 67 of the 81 counties of the state by non-residents against foreign
railroads maintaining soliciting agencies within the state. Even more
recently, Judge Senn of Steele County in Minnesota held it to be within
the discretion of the court to dismiss five suits against foreign railroads
brought by non-residents involving claims for personal injuries which
accrued outside the state. He justified the refusal to entertain the actions
by pointing to the crowded condition of the dockets, the unnecessary expense
imposed on local taxpayers and on the defending carriers, the resultant
burden on interstate commerce, and the fact that the plaintiffs had come
mainly because they believed they could secure large verdicts. New York
Sun. Oct. 18, 1929, at 28. Cf. also Chicago Ry. v. Wolf, 226 N. W. 297 (Wis.
1929).
- O'Bricn v. So. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 292 Fed. 379 (S. D. Ala. 1923) ; cf.
Sioux Renvedy v. Cope, supra note 20; Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1904] 2
K. B. 495 (the international charactcr of London apparently brings the
English courts against the same problem on a world wide scale). See Han-
sell, loc. cit. supra note 7.
47 Supra note 36, at 805, 128 S. E. at 45.
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preferable to a rigid statutory prohibition.s By the former
method of control, the abuse by a suitor 3 of a court's power to
take jurisdiction can readily be held in check by the court itself,
but if, as in the Murnan case, extreme facts indicate that the
plaintiff would be without adequate remedy unless the cause of
action is heard in that particular forum, the boundaries of the
court's jurisdiction are still sufficiently flexible to prevent an
obvious injustice.
CAPITAL STOCK TAXES AND TAXES ON SHARES
In the recent case of. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R. R.,1
the railroad successfully contended that, in valuing the corpora-
tion's capital stock for purposes of a capital stock tax, the taxing
authorities should not include the value of shares held by the
railroad in a subsidiary 2 corporation which had paid a capital
stock tax. This decision relied on the case of Cammonwealth v.
Fall Brook Coal Co. 3 in which the court based a similar holding
upon the alleged policy of the state looking with disfavor upon
double taxation; this policy was inferred in part from other cases
but principally from a statute providing that where a capital
stock tax had been paid by.a corporation, the shares thereof
should be exempt from taxation as personal property in the
hands of the shareholders.4
48Supra note 32.49 The exercise of discretion under any particular set of facts would, of
course, be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court. This
would act as a check on a state court's own abuse of its, power to refuse
to exercise jurisdiction.
1147 Atl. 242 (Pa. 1929).
2 Where one corporation holds shares in another corporation the former
will herein be designated the "holding" and the latter the "subsidiary"
corporation without regard to the proportion of the second corporation's
shares controlled by the first corporation.
3 156 Pa. 488, 26 At. 1071 (1893); accord: Union Trust Co. v. Detroit,
170 Mich. 692, 137 N. W. 122 (1912); Robertson v. Mississippi Valley Co.,
120 Miss. 159, 81 So. 799 (1919); Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Moore,
62 Mont. 132, 171 N. W. 912 (1922) (deduction from valuation for capital
stock tax of value of shares held in subsidiary 'where subsidiary 'was liable
to a capital stock tax even where the subsidiary had not as a. matter of
fact paid such a tax); McCormick and Co. v. Bassett, 49 Utah 444, 164
Pac. 852 (1917). Contra: Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 131 Ark.
40, 198 S. W. 702 (1917), aff'd, 138 Ark. 581, 211 S. W. 662 (1919), 251
U. S. 532, 40 Sup. Ct. 304 (1920).
4PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 20404 provided for a personal property tax
on loans, moneys, credits, and other personal property, except "shares of
stock in any bank, or corporation, or limited partnership that may be liable
to a tax . . . on its capital stock . . . " in 'whosever's hands the shares
may be. Similar provisions are found in ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
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It will be noted that the decisions in these Pennsylvania cases
assumed (1) that a capital stock tax, levied against a corporation
without any deduction with respect to shares owned by it in
another corporation, would be tantamount to a tax upon such
shares, and (2) that a tax upon the shares in a corporation which
had already paid a capital stock tax would be "double taxation."
An examination into the scope and validity of these assumptions
is essential to an understanding of the application of a tax on
capital stock.
In addition to sharing the burdens of natural persons in the
payment of such taxes as those on real and personal property
and on income, corporations are subjected to forms of taxation
not imposed upon individuals, such as franchise taxes 5 and
taxes relating to particular types of corporate enterprises.'
Moreover, many legislatures have not been content thus to tax
corporations merely upon specific types of property or upon
separate elements of the corporate enterprise. Under the title
"capital stock tax" such legislatures have sought to add another
tax; these statutes, however, set forth neither an arbitrary lump
sum nor any familiar basis (such as gross receipts, or units of
business, or net earnings, or value of specific property, etc.) as
a method of determining the tax. The term "capital stock" has
no well-recognized meaning, and is employed by lawyers, ac-
countants and business men in a variety of different senses."
Moses, 1921) § 9892; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 120, § 3; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 1410; KAN. Rsv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 79, § 310;
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 61, § 4a (16).
5 Annual franchise taxes purport to tax the privilege of doing business
in the state and are usually measured by "the capital stock issued and out-
standing," ie., an arbitrary value in dollars bearing no necessary relation
to the value of the property of the corporation. See Chicago v. Chicago
City Ry., 245 Il. App. 473 (1927); Isaacs, The Subject and Measure of
Ta 'ation (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 939.
• For example, taxes on corporate loans, insurance premiums, etc.
T The term "capital stock" may refer to a "value" probably conceived in
terms of moi-ey, to property, or to the legal relations which constitute
"shares." In 14 C. J. 379, capital stock is described as "the sum total
(a sum of money?) fixed by the charter or articles of incorporation as
the amount paid or to be paid in as the capital upon which the corporation
is to do business." In People v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 433, 434, 27 N. E. 818,
819 (1891), referring to a situation involving taxation, it was said that
"there are reasons in abundance for the conclusion that by the phrase
'capital stock,' the statute means not shares of stock, but the capital owned
by the corporation." Compare the use of the term made in BERLE, STUDIES
IN CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 41, to refer to shares: "Control of Ameri-
can Corporations by holders of a minority of the capital stock is no nov-
e lty . . . . . "
A use of the term "capital stock" to refer to the property owned by the
corporation and upon which the capital stock tax purports to be levied,
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Consequently, on its face a "capital stock tax" is practically
meaningless, and it is therefore not surprising that "capital
stock tax" statutes in different states provide diverse methods
of determining the incidence of the tax.8
The Pennsylvania statute," while more specific than that of
most states imposing a "capital stock tax," would seem to be
fairly typical. It provides Lo that the annual report of the cor-
poration's officers to the Auditor-General shall include "a valua-
tion and appraisal, in the manner hereinafter provided, of the
capital stock of the corporation . . . at its actual value in cash
as it existed at the year for which the report is made," and
further requires 1 the affidavit of certain officers " . . . that,
with fidelity and according to the best of their knowledge and
belief, they have estimated, valued and appraised the capital
stock of said corporation at its actual cash value. .. ; not less,
however, than first, the average which said stock sold for during
the year; and second, not less than the price or value indicated
or measured by net earnings or by the amount of profit made
* . ; and third, not less than the actual value indicated or
measured by consideration of the intrinsic value of its tangible
property and assets, and of the value of its goodwill and fran-
chises and privileges as indicated by the material results of
their exercise, taking also into consideration the amount of its
indebtedness."
Such a tax seems to assume that the worth of a corporation
(its property, franchises, goodwill, etc.) can be categorically
determined, and represented by a figure in dollars. The scheme
appears to be to deduct from this figure the value of certain
corporate property already taxed,1 2 principally real estate, and
then to collect a percentage of the remainder by way of revenue
under the name of a "capital stock tax."
Obviously, corporate property has no such categorical "value."
Original cost, original cost less depreciation, replacement cost,
forced sale price, leisurely sale price, may all be quite different
figures, and yet "value" might be expressed by any one of.them.
An attempt to have a single figure in dollars represent the prop-
-will be herein adhered to as being the most convenient for the purposes of
this Comment; as thus employed the term does not describe a "value."
8 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 9961; IND. REv. STAT.
(Burns, 1926) § 14137; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 79, art. 3, § 310;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 2004; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingwny, 1927)
§ 8198; Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 12775; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 20363,
§ 20364; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917) § 794.
9 Supra, note 8.
10 PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 20363.
11 Ibid. § 20364.




erty for all purposes must under many circumstances prove
abortive. Consequently, capital stock taxes in various states,
as in Pennsylvania, are frequently based upon some estimate
of the "value" of the total shares outstanding.13 The theory
probably is that the cash value which the market, the Auditor-
General, or, it may be, the corporation itself, places upon the
total shareholders' interests is a good estimate of the corpora-
tion's "net worth," i.e., of the "value" of its property interests
of all kinds, taking into account its earnings, assets and liabili-
ties, and general business condition.
If, then, a capital stock tax is merely a tax measured by an
arbitrary figure assumed to designate a corporation's "net
worth," it is difficult to see any logical necessity for declaring
such a tax to be a tax on any particular portion of the corpora-
tion's property the value of which may contribute to its "net
worth." Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court, when confronted
with a case 14 similar to that of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
R. R.15 and involving a similar statute,ir refused to take this
step. The court said: "The failure to deduct the value of shares
from the capital stock (of the holding corporation) is not tanta-
niount to assessing the shares of stock in the other (subsidiary)
corporation."I
In addition to the aforementioned taxes levied against cor-
porations, shareholders are frequently subject to taxation upon
their shares either under provisions for personal property tax-
ation Is or under statutes such as those specifically taxing the
shares of national banks. 9  The Pennsylvania statute, 2 upon
which the decision in Commonwealth v. Fall Brook Coal Co.21
13 See statutes supra note 8.
14 Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, supra note 3.
15 Supra note 1.
16 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 9892.
17 Supra note 3, at 41, 198 S. W. at 702.
Is See statutes supra note 4. When a corporation's capital stock is lo-
cated outside the jurisdiction the state cannot levy a tax thereon. Hawley
v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201 (1914). The shares are, however,
taxable to the shareholder. Dupuy v. Johns, 261 Pa. 40, 104 Atl. 565
(1918); Commonwealth v. Sunbury Converting Works, 286 Pa. 545, 134
Atl. 438 (1926); Chesebrough v. San Francisco, 153 Cal. 559, 96 Pac.
288 (1908).
199 STAT. 11978, 11981 (1919), 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1926). The federal
statute creating national banks, while exempting them from taxation on
their capital stock, expressly permits the taxation of their shares in the
hands of the shareholders. In this situation the tax may be collected from
the corporation, which then acquires a right against the shareholders to
reimbursement. United States Electric Power Co. v. State, 79 Md. 63,
28 Atl. 768 (1894).
20 Supra note 4.
21 Supra note 3.
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relied, prohibited the imposition of a personal property tax on
the shares of a corporation which had paid a capital stock tax.
A few courts, even in the absence of express statutory provisions,
have refused to enforce the collection of both of such taxes on
the ground that such a proceeding would be "double taxation"
and as such invalid under constitutional provisions requiring
equal taxation.22 In other jurisdictions where the question has
been raised, it has been held either that there was no "doubje
taxation" or that, even if present, "double taxation" is not ob-
jectionable.2 3
But what is "double taxation"? Adequate consideratipn of
this question is beyond the scope of this Comment, as it would
necessarily involve an inquiry into the nature of taxation. Suf-
fice it to say that the term "tax" denotes an aggregate of variable
factors, such as the jurisdiction imposing the tax, the person
paying, the period covered, the purpose (if any), the method
of computation,. the things or the legal relations constituting
the alleged incidence of the tax, etc. If "double taxation" means
22Dallas County v..Home Ins. Co., 97 Ark. 254, 133 S. W. 1113 (1911)
(construction of revenue statute to allow tax of shares and also of capital
stock would result in double taxation and therefore make it uncontu-
tional); San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 63 Cal. 524 (183)
(corporation held not to be liable under statute taxing the capital Etoek
of corporations along with personal property, wheie shareholders had
already been taxed on the shares); East. Livermore v. Livermore Falls
Trust Co., 103 Me. 418, 69 AtL 306 (1907) (taxation statute construcd
not to intend imposition of tax on shares held by shareholders and alzo ca
the capital stock of the corporation as such to avoid double taxation);
Middlesex R. R. v. Charleston, 8 Allen 330 (Mass. 1864) (value of 1 .rconal
property owned by a corporation is included as a subject of taxation in the
taxation of shares and may not be taxed separately); Stroh v. City of
Detroit, 131 Micb. 109, 90 N. W. 1029 (1902) (taxation of rhares of a
corporation all of the property of which is located and taxed in the state
held double taxation and prohibited by constitutional provision for uniform-
ity of taxation); State v. Harris, 286 Mo. 278, 227 S. W. 818 (1920) (when
a corporation pays a tax upon its property, to tax the shareholders would
be double taxation); People v. Board of Assessors, 30 N. Y. Supp. 448
(Sup. Ct. 1894) (tax on shares where corporation issuing them was, taxed,
disallowed).
2 3 Cook v. City of Burlington, 59 Iowa 251, 13 N. W. 113 (1882) ; Illinois
Nat. Bank v. Kinsella, 201 III. 31, 66 N. E. 338 (1903) (tax on ahares and
on property of corporation not "double") ; Hunt v. Board of Commissioners,
82 Kan. 824, 109 Pac. 106 (1910); Siler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Ky.
100, 298 S. W. 189 (1927); Fish v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484 (1852); Bradley
v. Bander, 36 Ohio St. 28 (1880); People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244 (U.
S. 1866); cf. People v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 433, 27 N. E. 433 (1891)
(interests of shareholders and of the corporation are distinct and separate
for purposes of taxation); Miller v. City of Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 47
Sup. Ct. 280 (1927) (the court looked through "the artificial distinction
between a corporation and its members" to prevent indirect taxation of
income exempt under federal enactment); see Ballantine, Corporate Per-
sonality in Income Taxation (1921) 34 HAnv. L. REv. 573.
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the imposition of two taxes involving identical factors, then
there is no logical necessity for regarding the taxation of a cor-
poration upon its "capital stock" and the taxation of its share-
holders upon their shares as "double taxation," for the totality
of the legAl relations constituting the property interest which a
shareholder has on account of his "share" in a corporation (in-
cluding rights to participate in earnings, .and to vote, or duties
to pay calls, etc.) is a very different aggregate from the sum of
the corporation's legal relations with respect to its capital stock.21
Moreover, under any other plausible definition of "double taxa-
tion," the aforesaid taxes might be logically demonstrated not
to be "double taxation."
Logical considerations concerning "double taxation" are, how-
ever, of comparatively slight importance in determining the
policy of those drafting taxation statutes. Except for rather
rare interpretations of constitutional provisions for uniformity
of taxation,25 there is nothing to forbid "double taxation," how-
ever defined, should the legislature decide to impose it. Further-
more, even if a policy of the state against "double taxation" has
been declared, the problem of whether or not to regard a particu-
lar tax as "double taxation" should be governed by practical
rather than logical considerations. The ultimate question would
appear to be whether or not the proposed tax will impose an
impolitic burden on the source of revenue.
In other situations which involve taxation of capital stock or
of shares, it does not appear that the courts consistently identify
the legal relations which shareholders (corporate or otherwise)
have by reason of their "ownership" of shares with the legal
relations of the issuing corporation with respect to its capital
stock; nor does it appear that, where a corporation holds shares,
the courts consistently identify the legal relations constituting
such shareholdership with the legal relations of the holding cor-
poration with respect to its capital stock of which such shares
are a part.
In the case of tax-exempt securities, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to permit the inclusion of tax-exempt shAres
in the capital stock of the corporation for purposes of a capital
stock tax.26 But the same court has upheld a tax upon share-
24 If the value of the shares and the value of the capital stock are
differently arrived at, as where the shares are valued at par or on the
basis of the amount paid in for them, the capital stock tax and the tax on
shares may be derived from values which are not necessarily related.
25 See cases supra note 22. Cf. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928)
447: "Because of the fact that a uniform general property tax as a primary
source of revenue no longer fits economic conditions of the American
states, there has been a definite tendency away from constitutional provi-
sions requiring such a tax."
26 Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black. 620 (U. S. 1862); cf.
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holders with respect to their shares on the basis of a valuation
of the corporation's assets which includes such tax-exempt se-
curities 'T
It has been held 2s that shares owned by a holding corporation
in a subsidiary, where the subsidiary is exempt from any capital
stock tax, are to be excluded from the capital stock of the holding
corporation in calculating its capital stock tax. This situation
corresponds to that in Commonwealth v. Pensylvanic R. R., -9
except that there the subsidiary had been already taxed. But
where the subsidiary would have been liable to taxation on its
capital stock had the property not been located outside the
jurisdiction, the shares in the hands of a holding corporation
are required to be included in its capital stock for taxation.3
For the purpose of a tax on'shares in the hands of a share-
holder of a holding corporation, the United States Supreme Court
has held 31 that shares in a subsidiary which is exempt from a
capital stock tax are to be excluded from the assets of the holding
corporation. In this case the holding corporation had previously
paid a tax on the shares in its capacity of shareholder. The
case would seem to be a step away from the securities case re-
ferred to above 32 in the same court, insofar as it recognizes a
close relationship between the interests of the shareholders and
of the corporation upon which the instant case is predicated.
Consfderations of convenience might be advanced in favor of
the establishment, at least throughout taxation situations, of a
uniform rule recognizing the correlation of the shareholders'
to the corporation's interests; but the economic factors entering
into each taxation problem are probably of greater weight in
determining the solution to be applied by the legislature or court,
than a desire for uniformity necessitating an arbitrary disregard
of such factors.
Bank Tax Case, 2 Wail. 200 (U. S. 1864) (states not allowed to impo3e
a franchise tax based on capital stock valuation including United States
securities).
27 Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. .Ct. 571
(1905); Montana Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499, 48 Sup. Ct.
331 (1927).
28 308 Mo. 237, 271 S. W. 508, 39 A. L. R. 1203 (1925).
29 Supra note 1.
30 Commonwealth v. Shenango Furnace Co., 268 Pa. 283, 110 At!. 721
(1920); Del. L. and W. R. R. v. Penn., 198 U. S. 341, 25 Sup. Ct. 669
(1905); cases supra note 18.
s11Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476, 39 Sup. Ct. 165
(1919); (1919) 19 CoL. L. Rnv. 59.
32 Supra note 27.
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CREDIT SALES AT A PRICE IN EXCESS OF THE CASH SALE PRICE AS A
VIOLATION OF THE USURY LAWS
Usury is said originally to have meant what is now called
interest, i.e., any excess over the amount of a loan received in
return.1 In early England the taking of any interest was "ille-
gal"; later the charging of various rates of interest was author-
ized by statute; and in 1854 the usury laws were repealed.2 The
present factual meaning of usury is entirely statutory and refers
only to interest above a rate established by law. 3
Such moral taint as may attach to usury is based upon the
premise that any charge above the rate which the law has estab-
lished is unjust and improper. But "usury" and "extortion" are
not necessarily synonymous, and "there are many loans which
are legally usurious that are not morally usurious." 4 An inher-
ent weakness in the usury laws exists in the failure thus to
recognize that certain loans at unlawful interest are not neces-
sarily extortionate. 5
Interest is commonly regarded as composed of "pure" interest,
a charge made solely for the use of money, plus the cost of
certain other factors involved in the lending of money, such as
risk, stipervision over investments, investigation, the amount and
duration of the loan, and the productiveness of capital in other
fields.6 Obviously the legislative establishment of a lawful rate
I Discussions of the history of usury may be found in 3 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (1920) § 1682; WEBB, USURY (1899) C. 1; ORD, USURY (3d ed. 1809)
c. 1; RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS (1924) pt. 2.
2 See 14 ENCYCLOPJEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 408 for a complete
summary of the English Usury Acts to the Money-Lenders Act of 1900.
The most important are: 37 HEN. VIII, c. 9 (1545) (legal rate 10 per
cent; loans at higher rate unlawful); 5 and 6 EDW. VI, c. 20 (1552). (re-
pealing the prior act); 13 ELIZ. c. 8 (1571) (reenacting same); 21 JAC.
I. c. 17 (1624) (reduction to 8 per cent).; 12 CAR. II, c. 13 (1660) (6 per
cent) ; 12 ANNE, stat. 2, c. 16 (1713) (5 per cent). This last rate continued
until 1854 when all usury laws were repealed by 15 and 16 VxcT. c. 90.
The texts of the acts of 37 HEN. VIII, 13 ELIZ., and 12 ANNE appear in the
Appendix to ORD, op. cit. supra note 1. The usury laws of the American
colonies are discussed in RYAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25, and are tabu-
lated, ibid. 27; see also ibid. c. 8.
3 "Usury may be defined as interest in excess of the legal rate charged
to a borrower for the use of money." See Medical Arts Building Co. v.
Southern Finance and Development Co., 29 F. (2d) 969, 971 (C. C. A. 5th,
1929); Bahl v. Miles, 6 S. W. (2d) 661, 663 (Mo. 1928); cf. Whitworth v.
Davey, 279 Mo. 672, 678, 216 S. W. 736, 737 (1919): "In this day and age,
in the absence of a law limiting the rate of interest, there can be no usury."
The lawful interest rates of the various states together with the penalties
for violation may be found tabulated in RYAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at
28-31; 4 COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE (U. S. Unit) § 1544.
4 RYAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 114.
5 Ibid. 8-10.
6 It may be assumed that "pure" interest is very nearly a constant for
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of interest can exert no control whatever over these factors,7
and the attempt to provide usury laws to their utter disregard
has proven futile.s More recently the scope of the usury laws
has continually been diminished by narrow construction; 0 and
by statutes exempting call money,10 denying the defense of usury
to corporations, 1 and permitting a rate of interest equivalent to
42 per cent a year 12 on small loans. 3
all classes of investments. It is the variation in the other factors which
produces a varying interest rate for different types. In the so-called "small
loans," loans for consumptive purposes, usually under $300, unsecured,
and to be repaid from wages, these factors exert their maximum influence
to produce a high rate of interest. HODSON, MONEY-LENDERS (1919) 21.
The variation becomes increasingly apparent in comparing such loans with
call-money loans, commercial loans, and secured loans such as bonds and
mortgages. At the farthest extreme are obligations such as United States
Government Bonds, the rate on" which is said most nearly to represent
"pure" interest. GowER AND HANSEN, PmRCI LES OF ECONOMXICS (1928)
486.
7 
"Economic laws cannot be repealed by acts of legislatures." HODSON,
op. cit. supa note 6, at 24.
8 The lack of success of the usury laws has been widely recognized. As
early as 1776 Adam Smith, speaking of the absolute prohibition in some
countries of lending at interest, stated: "This regulation, instead of pre-
venting, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury; the
debtor being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for the
risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use.
He is obliged, if one may say so, to insure his creditor from the penalties
of usury." ADA= SmrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) bk. 2, c. 4.
Though Adam Smith is speaking of an entire prohibition of interest, the
same reasoning is applicable to the legal establishment of a fixed maximum
rate. HODSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 25. The views of Tergot, Bentham
and other economists are discussed in RYAN, loc. cit. supra note 1.
9 Straus v. Elless Co., 222 N. W. 752 (Mich. 1929); Alston v. American
Mortgage Co., 116 Ohio St. 643, 157 N. E. 374 (1927). This is especially
true where usury statutes are penal in character. Byrd v. Link-Neweomb
Mill and Lumber Co., 118 Miss. 179, 79 So. 100 (1918); Fee Shelley v.
Byers, 73 Cal. App. 44, 57, 238 Pac. 177, 182 (1925).
0 NEW YOPRK CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 21, § 379.
"1 DEL. REv. CODE (1915) c. 65, § 78, amended by Del. Laws 1927, c. 85,
§ 23; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 131; N. J. Co?.xg. STAT.
(1910) 5706, § 7; N. M!. ANN. STAT. (1915) § 941; N. Y. CONS. LAWS
(Cahill, 1928) c. 21, § 374; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8705; PA.
STAT. (Supp. 1928) § 5770a; S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) § 3642 (coupons
and bonds only); VA. CODE ANN. (1924) § 5556; W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Barnes, 1923) c. 52, § 22. The Illinois Statute has been repealed. Ill.
Laws 1925, p. 452.
22 It is said that the usury laws are for the "prevention of extortion and
unjust oppression by unscrupulous persons who are ready to take undue
advantage of the necessities of others." See State v. Griffin, 83 Conn. 1,
3, 74 Atl. 1068, 1069 (1910). The borrower most needing this protection is
the one borrowing small sums for consumptive purposes. Such loans fall
within the Small Loan Laws enacted by a majority of the states. Yet
here, after a careful consideration of the factors involved in such lending,
a rate of 31/2 per cent a month on unpaid balances was recommended by
19301
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The business of selling merchandise on credit and of financing
such sales has become a tremendous factor in present day social
and economic organization." For example, a workman desires
to purchasd an automobile of which the "cash delivered" price
is $800. He has but $500 in ready money and wishes to arrange
convenient terms in order to pay the balance from his salary.
Three possibilities are presented: (1) he may borrow $300, if
he is able to obtain a loan, and pay for the car in full; (2) he
may induce the dealer to divide the unpaid balance into monthly
instalments for which he will give interest bearing notes; or (3),
the usual procedure, the transaction may be financed by a com-
pany organized for that business. In the last case the usual
method is this: 'r to the cash price of the car is added a "finance"
or "service" charge, the aggregate constituting the credit pur-
chase price; forty to fifty per cent of this price is required to
be paid down in cash and the balance is divided into convenient
(usually monthly) instalments for which a series of notes is
given. The finance charge includes interest, the cost of investi-
gation, and frequently insurance coverage. Translated into
terms of interest upon the unpaid balance, the finance charge
may exceed the rate'which is permitted by law upon loans. As-
suming that this is so and that the interest charged in the first
two cases exceeds the lawful rate, the question is whether or
not these transactions are usurious.
In the first instance the workman might, of course, apply to
a small loan company to secure the necessary amount, but the
usual rate of 32 per cent a month on the unpaid balance is rather
distasteful. He is more likely therefore to borrow the sum
needed from some "friend" who, in view of the risk involved,
will exact a sufficient consideration to compensate himself for
the hazard. But if the rate at which the money is loaned ex-
ceeds that permitted by law, the transaction is usurious and may
subject the lender to a forfeiture of all or double interest; or
to a loss of principal as well; or, in some jurisdictions, to a crim-
inal prosecution.16
the sponsors. GENERAL FORM OF THE UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW (Russell
Sage Foundation, 1929).
is See RYAN, op. cit. supra note 1, App. I, for a tabulated digest of the
Small Loan Laws of the states.
14 See 1 SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALMENT SELLING (1927) C.
4. Automobiles, vacuum cleaners, radios, wearing apparel, and other com-
modities sold on the so-called "budget" plan. Ibid. 51. See also COMER,
THE TEN-PAYMENT PLAN OF RETAILING MEN'S CLOTHING (1926).
is Cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68,
262 S. W. 425 (1924); Standard Motors Finance Co. v. Mitchell Auto Co.,
173 Ark. 875, 293 S. W. 1026 (1927).
16 Supra note 3.
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In the second case, the workman has arranged for deferred
payments, and has given the dealer notes which bear interest
in excess of the legal limit. There is some dispute among the
courts as to whether or not the transaction is usurious. Some
courts hold that in any case where a note upon its face bears
interest higher than the lawful rate, the transaction involves
usury.' Other courts, however, regard the transaction as pur-
suant to a bona fide sale and hence not within the scope of the
usury statute.2s
As to the third case, the rule is well established that the bona
fide sale of an article at a credit price which is higher than the
cash price of the article is not usurious, even though the dif-
ference between the two prices exceeds the amount of interest
which could lawfully have been charged on the cash price.10 The
application of the rule is not limited to sales of merchandise
alone, but extends equally to the sale of real property,-' the sale
of bonds or notes at a discount,21 and to payments for work and
labor 22 This rule, however, also has its limits. If the sale at
317 Mitchell v. Griffith, 22 Mo. 515 (1856) ; People's Bank v. Jackson, 43
S. C. 86, 20 S. E. 786 (1894); E. Tris Napier Co. v. Trawick, 164 Ga. 781,
139 S. E. 552 (1927).
2S McAnsh v. Blauner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1928),
aff'd, 248 N. Y. 537, 162 N. E. 515 (1928).
In Atlas Securities Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan. 393, 395, 260 Pac. 659, 660
(1927), it is said that "a bona fide sale at [a higher credit price] is not
usurious, irrespective of whther the credit price is made up of the cash
price plus a rate of increase which would exceed the legal intereat rate,
or whether a note is given and the increase put in the form of interest
thereon, even if in excess of the legal rate." Cf. Alston v. American Mort-
gage Co., supra note 9.
19 "On principle and authority, the owner of property, whether real or
personal, has a perfect right to name the price on which he is willing to
sell, and to refuse to accede to any other. He may offer to sell at a desig-
nated price for cash or at a much higher price on credit, and a credit sale
will not constitute usury however great the difference between the two
prices unless the buying and selling was a mere pretense." 27 R. C. L. 214.
See also 39 CYc. 926.
The above statement is supported by the decisions: Smith v. Kauf-
man, 145 Ark. 548, 224 S. W. 978 (1920); Commercial Credit Co. v. Shel-
ton, 139 Miss. 132, 104 So. 75 (1925); Pacific Finance Co. v. Lauman, 273
Pac. 48 (Cal. 1928) ; In re Bibbey, 9 F. (2d) 944 (D. Minn. 1925) ; General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich; Standard Motors Finance Co. v.
Mitchell Auto Co., both supra note 15.
2oBlackmore Investment Co. v. Johnson, 32 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 9th,
1929) ; Stark v. Bauer Cooperage Co., 3 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) ;
Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal. 557, 261 Pac. 1017 (1927) ; Edwards v. Wiley,
150 Ark. 480, 235 S. W. 54 (1921).
"1Medical Arts Building Co. v. Southern Finance and Development Co.,
supra note 3; People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Fenwick Sanitarium, 130 La.
723, 58 So. 523 (1912); In re Washer, 200 Cal. 598, 254 Pac. 951 (1927).
22Lamb v. Herndon, 275 Pac. 503 (Cal. 1929); see Davidson v. Davis, 59
Fla. 476, 478, 52 So. 139 (1910).
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a price above market value is a subterfuge to evade the usury
statute, and is essentially a loan of money, the attempt to exact
a higher rate of interest than the law allows will be held to in-
volve usury.23 In these cases the inquiry is not whether the price
charged is inflated or even exorbitant, but whether the trans-
action is a loan or a bona fide sale.2 4
The question at once arises as to why one case is clearly usur-
ious, one clearly not usurious, and the intermediate situation
disputed. In each case the workman purchases the automobile
at approximately the same cost to himself. The answer of the
courts is that the legal result depends upon whether the particu-
lar borrowing transaction constitutes a sale or a loan.2 5 But to
the workman, for whose protection the usury statutes were en-
acted, the distinction is merely one of words, since in each case
he is compelled to pay more than the legal rate of interest for
the credit which he has obtained.
The conclusion is not that the present system of financing
credit sales is one whereby the usury laws are evaded and high
charges are extorted from the public. The finance charge is in
most cases not unreasonable when due regard is given to office
expense, the costs of investigation, and the risk involved (these
in addition to the market rate of interest). The conclusion is
rather that the fictional character of the usury laws must be
recognized. As a device to prevent the imposition of a hard and
unconscionable contract upcn one in straightened circumstances
and in dire need of moiey, the laws sLill opciate in certain cases,
as they were originally and reasonably intended. But any at-
23 Sanford v. Hawthorne, 103 Neb. 867, 174 N. W. 863 (1919). So also
a sale of property to the lender at a low figure with option in the borrower
to repurchase at a higher price. Rosemead Co. v. Shipley Co., 278 Pac.
1038 (Cal. 1929) ; Hurt v. Crystal Ice and Cold Storage Co., 215 Ky. 739,
286 S. W. 1055 (1926); Sparks v. Robinson, 66 Ark. 460, 51 S. W. 460
(1899).
24 Norton v. Nathanson, 85 N. J. Eq. 409, 97 At]. 166 (1916); of. Turney
v. Goldberg's Loan Office, 274 Pac. 464 (Okla. 1928). A typical statement
may be found in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, supra note
15, at'77, 262 S. W. at 428. See also the famous case of Dry Dock Bank
v. American Life Insurance and Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 344, 359 (1850). The
line is frequently close, and here the courts attempt to ascertain the in-
tention of the parties. Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149 Md.
223, 131 Atl. 332 (1925) ; cf. Keese v. Parnell, 134 S. C. 207, 132 S. E. 620
(1925).
25 Supra note 24. On the other hand, as to the distinction b.tween a loan
and a sale, see FISHER, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1928) 935:
"A loan contract is at bottom a sale . . . a borrower is a seller of a note
of which the lender is the buyer. A bondholder is regarded indifferently
as a lender and as a buyei' of the bond." While perhaps the distinction
may not so easily be disposel of, yet it is true that in a close case, the




tempt to apply the same laws and standards to all present
economic and business conditions reveals their inherent inability
to meet these conditions and their consequent inadequacy as a
form of control over the vast field of modern commercial trans-
actions.
DELEGATION TO JUDICIAL BODIES OF POWER TO SUPERVISE THE
ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
In spite of the frequently repeated maxim that legislative
power may not be delegated, it has become quite evident in recent
years that, where the effective exercise of a power requires its
delegation, the mere fact of delegation alone will not be con-
sidered a ground of unconstitutionality.1  In determining the
validity or invalidity of specific delegations, the formula has been
frequently repeated that, while discretion to make law may not
be delegated, authority as to its execution may.2 The failure of
this and similar rules to furnish a readily applicable test has led
to many attempts to supply an adequate basis for determining
what powers may be delegated.3 Much of this difficulty has re-
sulted from a failure to realize that a consideration of whether
or not a specific power may be delegated is inseparable from a
consideration of the body, if any, to which such a power may
1 Note (1929) 27 MicH. L. REv. 558, 561: " . . certain legislative
powers may be and must be delegated, and . . . the function of the
administrative tribunal is not merely that of fact-finding, but amounts to an
actual exercise of a fraction of the legislative function." See also Note
(1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 1118, 1119.
2 See State v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 515, 107 N. W.. 500, 516 (1906).
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make a law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and con-
ferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
objection can be made." Cincinnati, W. & Z. Ry. v. Clinton Com'rs, 1
Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
- See (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 571; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1151; (1925) 25
COL. L. REV. 359.
. ..the line between validity and invalidity is drawn dependent on
the presence or absence of tests and standards by which the officer in-
volved may be guided in exercising his discretion." Note (1927) 15 CALIF.
L. REv. 408, 410.
it would seem that in those cases where there is a practical
necessity and a strong public policy favoring delegation, the courts
will find a way to permit the legislature to reach the desired result." Note
(1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 58, 61.
Perhaps the suggestion which most clearly indicates the need for a prag-
matic consideration of the various social, political and economic factors in-
volved in a proposed delegation is that the "legislature must go as far as
it reasonably can . . . and then it may leave to administrative officers,
where it must, the power to fill in the details." Foster, The Delegation of
Legislative Power to Administrative Officers (1913) 7 ILL. L. Rnv. 397, 402.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
be given. The statement that "legislative power" may not be
delegated to the courts is frequently encountered. 4 Forty states
have, in their constitutions, explicitly announced adherence to
the principle of separation of powers,5 and the remaining eight
purport to adhere to it by judicial interpretation of less specific
constitutional provisions.6 This note will be confined to a con-
sideration of the extent to which powers over the organization
of public corporations may be delegated to judicial bodies.
With increasing frequency state courts have been required to
construe the doctrine of separation of powers with reference to
this problem. From agricultural and industrial developments
has arisen a greater demand for the formation of such public
corporations as districts for drainage, irrigation, flood-control,
fire-prevention, electricity, power, and schools. As many state
legislatures are constitutionally prohibited from enacting special
laws in respect to each incorporation required,T they have ac-
cordingly found it necessary to have recourse to general laws
setting forth the preliminary methods of formation of such
districts and the conditions upon which the incorporation may
take place. Often a judicial body whose machinery is already
established and operating has been found the most expedient
tribunal to which to delegate the power to determine when a
group of petitioners has complied with the statute.
The recent case of Sealle v. Yensen 8 raises the problem of
what discretion concerning the incorporation of a district may
validly be given to a court. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the
issuance of bonds by a light and power district. The state legis-
lature had provided that after the formation of preliminary
plans for such a district, the district court should be authorized,
upon petition, to determine "whether or not the district should
be incorporated; and whether the suggested boundaries are rea-
sonable and proper for public convenience and welfare." It
was further provided that "the court may change, alter, and fix
the boundary lines of such district with the end in view of pro-
moting the interest of said power district .... " While it was
4 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 161.
5 A typical provision: "The powers of government shall be divided into
three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial-each
of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or col-
lection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except in the instances in this Constitution expressly
directed or permitted." Mo. CONsT. art. 3.
6 DoDD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 58.
Cf. Kirkpatrick v. State, 5 Kan. 673 (1868); Ford v. North Des Moines,
80 Iowa 626, 45 N. W. 1031 (1890); People v. Ontario, 148 Cal. 625, 84
Pac. 205 (1906).
8 226 N. W. 464 (Neb. 1929).
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indicated in the opinion that these powers might have been
delegated to a proper body, the delegation to a judicial body was
held unconstitutional.9
When the courts uphold such delegating acts, they almost uni-
formly base the result upon the ground that the designated
judicial body is required only to ascertain the existence of facts
declared necessary by the legislature. 0 In declaring such acts
invalid, the reason generally assigned is that the designated judi-
cial body is required not only to ascertain an issue of fact, but
also to exercise legislative discretion.1' But when does a court
merely determine the existence of a condition or fact--constitu-
tionally, and when is it exercising legislative discretion-uncon-
stitutionally? To say that an act is valid so long as it requires
the judicial body to ascertain only the existence of facts is to
adopt an illusory and ever-shifting standard.2
It seems doubtful whether any particular type of delegating
statute which may be designated as universally valid or invalid
can be singled out. At one extreme fall those which require a
judicial body to determine whether a proposed incorporation
"will be conducive to the public health, convenience, or welfare.
9 See DODD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 69.
10 Kayser v. Trustees of Bremen, 16 Mo. 88 (1852) ; Blake v. People, 109
ll. 504 (1884).
In Edgewater v. Liebhardt, 32 Colo. 307, 76 Pac. 366 (1904), the court
found it necessary to distinguish a provision empowering a judicial body to
determine "whether said tract . . . should be disconnected . . ." from
a provision allowing a court to disconnect territory from a municipal cor-
poration "if justice and equity require"; the latter it admitted would be
unconstitutional; -the former, it held, did not involve the exercise of legis-
lative discretion.
13 Territory v. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 23 Pac. 405 (1890); State v. Simons,
32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750 (1884) ; Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 11 N. D.
86, 88 N. W. 1023 (1902); North v. Board of Education, 313 Ill. 422, 145 N.
E. 158 (1924).
- For example, in Re Inc. Village of N. Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N.
W. 1033 (1896), the delegation to a court of the power to decide whether
"the lands embraced . . . ought justly to be included . . ." was held
invalid because involving more than the ascertainment of a fact or condi-
tion; in State v. Flaherty, 140 Minn. 19, 167 N. W. 122 (1918), a determin-
ation of whether the proposed plan "will be conducive to the public health,
safety, and convenience, . . ." was held valid as involving only a deter-
mination of fact. Cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 155. The author points
out that the customary distinction between pleading "fact" and pleading
"law" really involves only the problem of how specific the pleader must be.
It appears that the usual distinction between the determination of "facts"
decreed as prerequisites by the legislature, and the exercise of "legislative
discretion," may similarly be boiled down to an issue of how specific the
directions given by the legislature to the delegated judicial body must be.
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S. ., These have been said always to be invalid; 14 yet many
delegating statutes have been upheld which apparently give
nearly if not quite the same latitude to a judicial body." At
the other oxtreme are the statutes which provide for the forma-
tion of a corporation upon the request of a specified number of
petitioners, set the maximum and minimum amount of territory
which may be included, and thus leave to the judicial body only
to ascertain whether or not these statistical conditions have been
complied with; Ir or which leave it to the designated tribunal to
determine, on the basis of an engineer's report, whether all of
the land in a proposed district is susceptible of irrigation by the
same system of works. 1' It seems that this type of statute is
generally upheld even in those jurisdictions which construe
most strictly the principle of the separation of powers.1"
Many legislatures apparently have felt, however, that, unless
the tribunal designated to hear the incorporation petitions pos-
sessed more discretion in deciding whether particular property
should be included within a proposed district, serious injustice
might be done to minority property holders. Accordingly, they
have frequently attempted to give the designated judicial body
the power to exclude from a proposed irrigation district land
which, owing to its location or peculiar features, would be likely
to receive little benefit from the improvements contemplated.
But such attempts have in many instances been held unconstitu-
tional, 1 thereby removing any possibility of a flexible adaptation
of the statute to the peculiar requirements of a specific district.20
13 Tyson v. Washington County, 78 Neb. 211, 110 N. W. 634 (1907).
14 MCQUILLIN, 10c. cit. supra note 4. But cf. State v. Flaherty, supra
note 12.
15 Cf. cases infra notes 27-33.
16 State v. Churchill County, 30 Nev. 225, 94 Pac. 70 (1908) (court re-
quired to find if majority of inhabitants have signed petition); Nash v.
Fries, 129 Wis. 120, 108 N. W. 210 (1906) (required to find if facts set
forth in petition were true) ; In re Kochkoning Drainage District, 221 N.
W. 864 (Wis. 1928) (if court satisfied petition properly signed).
IT In re Harper Irr. Dist., 108 Ore. 598, 216 Pac. 1020 (1923).
18 Blake v. People, 109 Ill. 504 (1884) ; cases infra note 27.
19 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152 (1874) ; Funkhouser v. Randolph,
287 Ill. 94, 122 N. E. 144 (1919); North v. Board of Education, 313 I1.
422, 145 N. E. 158 (1924); In re Village of N. Milwaukee, supra note 12;
State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750 (1884); Glaspell v. City of
Jamestown, supra note 11 (if court finds petition can bo granted without
injustice to persons interested); City of Morristown v. Shelton, 38 Tenn.
24 (1858) (conferring on circuit courts "full power" to create corpora-
tions); In re Brenke, 105 Minn. 84, 117 N. W. 157 (1908) (if land may be
detached without affecting symmetry of settled portion of municipality).
20 Cf. State v. Village of Dover, 113 Minn. 452, 130 N. W. 74 (1911);
Schweigert v. Abbott, 122 Minn. 383, 142 N. W. 723 (1913); Winkler v.
Hastings, 85 Neb. 212, 122 N. W. 858 (1909) ; Forsyth v. City of Hammond,
71 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1896).
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The early Illinois case of Galesburg v. Hawkinson 21 appears
to have been a factor of much influence in decisions denying
validity to those statutes which delegate any considerable dis-
cretion to the judicial tribunal. In that case a statute was held
unconstitutional which allowed a court to decide whether terri-
tory might be annexed to an incorporated town "vithout injus-
tice to the . . . persons interested." The decision was placed
on the broad ground that, as the power to change the boundaries
of a municipal corporation was vested in the legislature, -2 2 it was
"impossible that the courts should be invested with such power."
Since that decision, it has become evident from numerous cases
that delegation to judicial bodies of powers which might be exer-
cised by the legislature is not at all "impossible"; 23 but Gales-
burg v. Hawkinson is still cited as a reason for declaring statutes
unconstitutional which purport to delegate power to judicial
bodies. Its influence was particularly noticeable in Fun khouser
v. Randolph,* where the Illinois court decided that a statute was
unconstitutional which authorized the county court to revise the
boundaries of a proposed drainage district "if it . . . appear
. . . that the boundaries . . . as proposed . . . do not em-
brace all the lands that will be benefitted. . . " Cases in
Wisconsin 25 and North Dakota21 which the court cited to sus-
tain its decision involved statutes where the powers of the
designated judicial body were but slightly restrained by the
statute and therefore were hardly analogous. The only other
cases cited by the court were Galesburg v. Hawkinson and later
decisions relying on it; but no new reason was supplied to replace
the underlying argument of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, which had
long since been recognized as of no force27 Without some such
new reason applicable to present conditions, it would seem un-
justifiable to follow the decision of the Galesburg case.
Many decisions do not require the restriction of the powers
of the designated judicial tribunal to a mere determination of
the presence of statistical conditions formulated by the legisla-
ture. In the formation of drainage districts the discretion per-
mitted has been exceptionally broad. Thus it has been held
constitutional for a court to decide whether specific tracts in
21 Supra note 19.
22 The court evidently means: "by the legislature through some inferior
body whose duties are exclusively legislative." Cf. ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art.
4, § 22.
23 Cf. Blake v. People, supra note 10; cases infra notes 27-33.
24 Supra note 19.
2 Supra note 12.
!!G laspell v. City of Jamestown, supra note 11.
- Cf. Aldridge v. Matthews, 257 Ill. 202, 100 N. E. 536 (1912) ; Foutch
v. Zempel, 332 Ill. 192, 163 N. E. 546 (1928); Huston v. Clark, 112 I1. 344
(1884); 2 WILLOUGIBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1910) § '739.
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such a proposed district will be benefited; 23 similarly, a judicial
body has been allowed to determine whether the benefits of the
proposed drainage district are likely to exceed the costs. 20 Some
cases even, permit the court, after formation of a district, to
grant a petition for severance therefrom if it -finds that "justice
and equity" require. 0 Over the organization of school districts
powers of a judicial body almost as broad have been sustained.,1
In the organization of municipal corporations, courts have been
permitted to determine whether the proposed amount of terri-
tory is reasonably proportionate to the number of residents,2
and to allow such detachments of farm lands from a municipality
as will not affect the good government of adjacent territory."
These decisions appear to point towards an abandonment of
any strict application of the principle of separation of powers."
Obviously, it is no longer feared that there would be an "end of
everything" 39 should powers, formerly legislative, devolve in
part upon a judicial body. The force of the criticism that the
separation of powers has often "turned out to be not the keep-
ing apart of things really distinct but the forceable disjunction
of things naturally connected" 36 has doubtless been influential in
causing an increasingly greater consideration to be given the
28 State v. Drainage District, 123 Kan. 191, 254 Pac. 372 (1927); Barnes
v. Minor, 80 Neb. 189, 114 N. W. 146 (1907).
29 In re Valley Center Drainage District, 64 Mont. 545, 211 Pac. 218
(1922); Drainage District v. Bank of Dillon, 143 S. C. 178, 141 S. E. 274
(1927) ; ci. Lyon v. City of Payette, 38 Idaho 705, 224 Pac. 793 (1924).
30 In re Fulmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 Pac. 768 (1907) ; In re Barton, 33 Utah
50, 92 Pac. 770 (1907); cf. State v. Superior Court of Skagit County, 42
Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264 (1906).
32 In re Common School District, 222 N. W. 690 (S. D. 1928); Larson v.
Seneca School District, 50 S. D. 444, 210 N. W. 661 (1926). The court
points out that it is no more a violation of the principle of separation of
powers for a judicial body to act in the first instance than to exercise a
similar power on appeal. A court's appellate power on a similar issue had
already beep sustained. In re Yankton-Clay County Drainage District, 30
S. D. 79, 137 N. W. 608 (1912).
32 Baker v. Workman, 72 W. Va. 518, 78 S. E. 670 (1913).
3 Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N. E. 865 (1905). The court
points out that the work of the judiciary is "in its final analysis" chiefly
legislative.
34 GOODENOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911) 213.
35 MONTESQVIEU, ESPRIT DES LoIs, bk 2, c. 6; see Carpenter, The Separa-
tion of Powers in the 18th Century (1928) 22 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 32, 37.
36 2 BacE, MODERN DEM CRA cIES (1921) 468 et seq.: "The
American systcm . . . was built for safety, not for speed. . . ." Does
it not follow that wh.,:-r speed and expedient administration are obviously
needed. and where ,nu !wril to "safety" can be pointed out, the principle of
eparation of powcrs should not prevent a delegation to a judicial body
where that appears the most expedient method? Cf. WILSON, CONGRES-
SIONAL GOVERNMENT (7th ed. 1890) 284; Green, Separation of Govern-
mental Powers (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 369.
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factor of convenient administration when determining the con-
stitutionality of delegating statutes.3 t At any rate, the principle
should not be construed so as to prevent the employment of that
organ of government whose characteristic mode of action is most
appropriate for dealing with the situation the delegating statute
is designed to cover.3 8
3S See Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iowa 252, 258 (1876).
Is See Green, op. cit. supra note 36, at 378.
